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No. 233/February 2011 
Debt reduction without default? 
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a two-step, market-based approach to debt reduction: 
Step 1. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) would offer holders of debt of the countries with an EFSF 
programme (probably Greece, Ireland and Portugal = GIP) an exchange into EFSF paper at the market price prior to their 
entry into an EFSF-funded programme. The offer would be valid for 90 days. Banks would be forced in the context of the 
ongoing stress tests to write down even their banking book and thus would have an incentive to accept the offer. 
Step 2. Once the EFSF had acquired most of the GIP debt, it would assess debt sustainability country by country.  
a)  If the market price discount at which it acquired the bonds is enough to ensure sustainability, the EFSF will write 
down the nominal value of its claims to this amount, provided the country agrees to additional adjustment efforts 
(and, in some cases, asset sales).  
b)  If under a central scenario this discount is not enough to ensure sustainability, the EFSF might agree on a lower 
interest rate, but with GDP warrants to participate in the upside. 
A key condition for this approach to succeed in restoring access to private capital markets is that the EFSF claims are not 
made senior to the remaining claims and the new private bondholders. EFSF support must be comparable to an injection 
of equity into the country. 
While the EFSF concentrates on the exchange of the stock of bonds, the IMF could fund the remaining deficits in the 
usual way with bridge financing, until the fiscal adjustment is completed. The ECB would of course immediately stop its 
‘Securities Market Programme’, which would have lost its raison d’être. 
Introduction: The dilemma 
The EU resembles a group of highly interdependent 
companies with large cross-holdings of equity stakes. 
However, the formal structure of the group is very 
light. There is no central authority that can give orders 
to individual members of the group. When a subgroup 
of the EU member countries decided about ten years 
ago to adopt the same financing instrument, they 
acknowledged this limitation and created only a 
‘special purpose vehicle’ (the ECB) with the very 
narrow remit to look after the stability of their 
common currency. The articles of incorporation of 
EMU also stated explicitly that it was to remain a 
‘limited liability’ community because of this lack of 
powers of the central authorities of the group. 
However, in early 2010, one of its members got into 
trouble and the others discovered that financial 
markets had become so integrated that they could not 
seriously contemplate a failure of a fellow euro-area 
country. Hence, even the most reluctant creditor 
countries agreed to a €110 billion adjustment 
programme for Greece on the assumption that a 
combination of fiscal and structural adjustment would 
stabilise public debt and allow the country to regain 
market access soon. One year on, however, the 
situation has not improved. On the contrary, other 
member countries have experienced difficulties in 
accessing funds at reasonable rates. One of them, 
Ireland, was shut out of the market when the true 
scale of the losses in its banking system finally 2 | Gros & Mayer 
emerged. And, in the case of Greece, the debt 
dynamics has not turned around, nor has market 
access been restored. 
The euro area thus can no longer avoid facing the 
stark choice it wanted to evade in 2010: either it sticks 
to the ‘limited liability’ character of EMU (but in this 
case a sovereign default becomes likely), or it moves 
towards a fiscal union with a mutual guarantee for the 
public debt of all member countries. We regard the 
latter as dangerous, because without political union it 
would be open to legal challenges and would alienate 
the German electorate. 
The purpose of this note is to show a way out of this 
dilemma. In our view, the present crisis could be 
managed without changing the ‘limited liability’ 
character of EMU. 
We proceed in the following way. We start in section 
1 by analysing the fundamental issues raised by the 
construction of EMU as an asymmetric system. We 
then turn to the legacy of the 2010 decisions on the 
EFSF, together with the results of the European 
Council of October of that year. Section 3 briefly 
summarises the main steps to be taken, which are then 
detailed in the remainder of this note. 
1.  Managing the euro: An unresolved 
issue of symmetry 
An important motive for the launch of the euro was 
the desire to replace the monetary policy of the 
Bundesbank, which was said to have ‘asymmetric 
effects’ on Europe. Designed for Germany, it was 
‘exported’ to other European countries, where it often 
did not fit economic conditions, through the quasi-
fixed exchange rates of the European Monetary 
System. By forming a monetary union and 
committing the central bank to maintaining price 
stability on average within the union, the asymmetric 
policy of the Bundesbank was replaced by the 
symmetric policy of the ECB. However, since a 
political union to complement and fortify monetary 
union was rejected, a commensurate symmetrical 
fiscal union, where deficits of one region would be 
funded by surpluses in another region, was not on the 
agenda. Instead, each member country of EMU was 
supposed to exert a degree of fiscal policy discipline 
consistent with price stability in the euro area. To 
reinforce fiscal discipline, the Stability and Growth 
Pact was concluded, which somewhat implausibly 
envisaged that the same EMU member countries that 
refused to give up national sovereignty in a political 
union would accept an infringement of their fiscal 
policy sovereignty by European Union institutions. 
This unwillingness to cede fiscal sovereignty persists 
even today as can be seen from the fact that the 
proposal to make the sanctions under the SGP 
automatic had to be abandoned because most member 
states were not willing to accept this limitation of 
political discretion. 
As long as the disciplinary influence of the markets 
was suspended by the inflation of the global credit 
bubble, the absence of a symmetrical fiscal policy did 
not set a binding constraint on the run-up of big fiscal 
and external deficits and debt by certain peripheral 
EMU countries. The ratings agencies with their pro-
cyclical assessments reinforced this tendency as the 
fundamentals of these countries (in particular their 
growth rates) appeared good.  They did not notice that 
the high ratings sustained the very capital inflows that 
were behind these high growth rates. 
Although the Stability and Growth Pact envisaged 
monetary fines for the breach of fiscal discipline, such 
sanctions were never imposed. The Pact was applied 
only leniently for countries with clear fiscal problems, 
such as Greece, and was even changed in 2004 to 
avoid fines for Germany and France.  
The impression that sovereign lending inside the euro 
area was riskless was further reinforced by two 
regulatory choices: i) the capital adequacy rules of the 
ECB have a zero risk weighting for public debt of 
euro area member countries, and ii) the ECB did not 
apply any graduated haircuts to the public debt 
instruments it receives as collateral. 
With rising risk aversion of investors since the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, markets 
suddenly took fright at bloated government budget 
deficits and exorbitant debt levels (Figure 1).
1 Gros 
(2010c) shows how the combination of a drop in 
expected growth potential and an increased risk 
premium can fundamentally alter any sustainability 
assessment. 
Some countries (and their banks), deemed over-
indebted by the market, have now been shut off from 
market funding of their expiring old and upcoming 
new debt. That this applies to all of their debt is a new 
experience, as governments usually have recourse to 
the central bank to fund their domestic debt issuance 
via money creation as a measure of last resort. With 
the euro area community so far having failed to calm 
markets by providing financial assistance programmes 
to countries in trouble, a growing number of observers 
and market participants see no alternative to accepting 
this ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy at the euro 
area level, and to boost the ECB’s existing 
                                                      
1 Some (e.g. de Grauwe, 2011) have argued that the 
observed risk premia reflect more market misperceptions 
than real risk. There might certainly be elements of this, 
which can be self-reinforcing (both on the upside and the 
downside as the past has shown). However, while market 
prices might appear irrational at times, it is difficult to 
dispute that in some cases high spreads do signal indeed a 
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programme for the purchase of EMU sovereign bonds 
(Securities Market Programme, or SMP). So far, 
however, the ECB has resisted the pressure to do this 
(Figure 2). Moreover, it has tried to wean banks in 
troubled countries off their reliance on its cheap 
funding via repo operations, but only with limited 
success given the extreme reliance of banks in both 
Greece and Ireland on ECB funding (see Table 1).  
Figure 1. Yield spreads of euro area sovereign bonds 
over Bunds 
Sources: Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research. 
Figure 2. ECB purchases of government bonds  
 
 
Sources: ECB, DB Global Markets Research. 
Table 1. ECB net lending to banks in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, December 2010 
 As % GDP  € billions  As % of 
domestic 
deposits 
    
Greece 37% 97.8  27% 
Ireland 68% 94.6  31% 
Portugal 24%  42.0  13% 
Spain 4%  61.6  3% 
Sources: AMECO, National central banks and ECB. 
In our view, those advocating large-scale purchases of 
government bonds of troubled countries by the ECB 
fail to see that the biggest and financially strongest 
country in EMU resists the fiscal dominance of 
monetary policy if it has no need to monetise its own 
government debt. Similarly, it will resist a symmetric 
fiscal policy, where it has to generate fiscal savings to 
balance deficits elsewhere. Thus, in a monetary union 
without political union, the biggest and financially 
strongest country sets a benchmark for fiscal policy, 
to which other countries have to adjust (assuming 
they cannot persuade or force this country to act 
against its own (perceived and short-term) national 
interest). It is therefore not surprising that the 
complaints of those who feel bothered by ‘asymmetric 
policies’ are now directed to Berlin instead of 
Frankfurt, as in the past. Moreover, when monetary 
policy is run symmetrically and financial bail-outs of 
weak countries by strong countries are seen as 
violating the ‘limited liability nature’ of EMU, over-
indebted entities (sovereigns, banks) may default. 
Hence, a mechanism managing such defaults without 
creating risks to financial stability is needed.  
German policy-makers and the ECB are under heavy 
pressure to show ‘financial solidarity’ or to accept 
fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. 
However, to the extent that they accommodate the 
pressure for fiscal transfers to troubled countries or 
fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy, the 
scepticism of the German electorate towards the euro 
will rise. If the tolerance level of German voters is 
exceeded, the danger increases that a ‘tea party’ 
movement for Germany’s exit from EMU would 
develop. The paradox is that the more policy-makers 
or the ECB pressure the German voter and taxpayer to 
stabilise EMU in the near-term by helping over-
indebted countries financially or accepting a softening 
of the euro, the more they damage political support 
for EMU in Germany.  
2.  Continuing market tensions and 
unresolved issues 
The creation of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) with its headline figure of €750 
billion at a dramatic weekend meeting in May 2010 
calmed markets only temporarily. The adjustment 
programme of the EFSF for Ireland failed to restore 
market confidence in the EU’s ability to deal with 
countries experiencing financial difficulties. One 
reason is that the interest rate Ireland was given, close 
to 6%, is so much above the likely growth rate of the 
country for the near future that it will worsen its debt 
dynamics materially. Another reason might be that the 
lending capacity of the EFSF is de facto constrained 
by the guarantees of the remaining AAA-rated 
countries, which amount to about €255 billion. 
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But more fundamentally, the continuing tensions have 
in our view been caused more by three developments: 
i) The increasing fear that at least one EMU 
government may be insolvent and hence unable to 
service its financial debt without help from abroad. 
ii) The message from policy-makers that private 
creditors of an insolvent country will have to suffer 
losses in the future but that official creditors are not 
willing to share any losses, as evidenced by the 
declaration that the claims of the post-2013 ‘European 
Stability Mechanism’ would be senior to private 
claims. 
iii) The failure of policy-makers to explain how 
creditors would participate in a debt restructuring of 
an insolvent country and, in particular, what would 
happen to presently outstanding debt. 
The ECB has provided an element of stability by 
reluctantly intervening intermittently in the 
government bond market; officially to restore orderly 
market conditions, but in reality its interventions have 
been only of a ‘one-way’ character, sustaining the 
price of peripheral government debt. At the same 
time, however, the ECB has let it be known that in the 
end it will not let (fiscal) policy-makers off the hook 
by a wholesale funding of old and new debt of 
troubled countries via money creation. The ECB was 
thus not able to resolve the fundamental tensions 
created by the factors listed above. 
The inability to clarify what happens in case an EMU 
country not only suffers from a temporary liquidity 
crisis but is unable to repay its debt in the indefinite 
future has uncovered a major flaw in the architecture 
of EMU and triggered a flight from all but the safest 
sovereign bonds of EMU countries. Look at it this 
way: Passengers will hardly remain calm when the 
pilot of a four-engine plane announces that he has just 
lost two engines and offers another round of drinks to 
passengers as consolation. These passengers will 
demand that the pilot lands the plane at the nearest 
airport so that they can get out. By the same token, 
investors want to know how they will participate in 
any losses in the not-so-unlikely event that an EMU 
country defaults on its present outstanding debt. They 
feel very unsafe when authorities acknowledge the 
possibility of insolvency three years down the road, 
but exclude it for the near future, treating every 
troubled country as if it were only suffering a liquidity 
shortfall, piling large amounts of new debt on an 
already-worrisome high level of old debt. Like the 
passengers of the troubled plane, they want to get out, 
as soon as possible.  
3.  What can be done now? 
EMU has been compared to the gold standard of the 
1920s, where countries had fixed exchange rates 
(against gold and hence against each other). Some 
countries (notably the US) accumulated large current 
account surpluses (and gold reserves), while other 
countries (notably Germany) ran large current account 
deficits, which they financed mostly through short-
term capital flows. When international capital flows 
dried up in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, 
Germany and other deficit countries struggled to 
satisfy their borrowing needs. With Germany on the 
brink of default, the public lost confidence in the 
banking sector, and in 1931 Creditanstalt in Austria 
failed following a bank run. The subsequent mass 
failure of banks led to another downward leg of the 
depression until 1933. The lesson from the 
malfunctioning of the gold standard in the 1920s and 
1930s is that a system of fixed exchange rates needs 
an institution capable of managing external 
imbalances, providing emergency funding when 
capital markets seize up as well as designing and 
supervising adjustment programmes aimed at 
reducing these imbalances.  
The architects of the post-WWII US dollar standard 
had learned this lesson and hence created the 
International Monetary Fund to manage the system. 
Unfortunately, the architects of European Monetary 
Union disregarded this lesson and failed to build the 
corollary to the IMF, a ‘European Monetary Fund’, in 
time. They are now trying to make up for this 
omission by creating a ‘European Stability 
Mechanism’. But it is extremely difficult to correct a 
major structural flaw of the system in the midst of a 
crisis. The IMF was created before the new post-war 
global monetary system had even started to work. 
We argued a year ago that the eurozone needed a 
‘European Monetary Fund’ (Gros & Mayer, 2010). In 
the meantime, the eurozone has created an emergency 
funding mechanism, but not yet a ‘Fund’. European 
policy-makers seem to be reluctant to commit to a 
major institution innovation. We believe that such a 
step is now urgently needed to put in place a credible 
mechanism to deal with the existing debt overhang. 
Institutional innovations always take some time. 
However, even within the present setup, an integrated 
set of measures is possible and should be taken 
immediately to reduce uncertainty and restore orderly 
market conditions: 
i) All countries under severe financial pressure, for 
which markets price a high probability of default, 
should go under the EMU safety umbrella. Most 
likely, this group would consist of Greece and Ireland, 
which are already receiving help, as well as Portugal, 
which is close to being cut off from market funding. 
ii) All other countries would have to adopt credible 
policies for successful adjustment so that they retain 
access to market funding. Presently, the next country 
in line suffering from a lack of market confidence is Debt reduction without default? | 5 
Spain. Most economists, including the present 
authors, would regard market fears of an insolvency 
of Spain as vastly exaggerated. Spain has a relatively 
low public debt ratio, manageable banking sector 
problems (confined to the savings and loan segment) 
and a broadly-based economy with a solid growth 
potential. Reforms to increase flexibility in the labour 
market, restructuring in the banking sector and 
consolidation of finances of regional governments and 
the pension system would go a long way to reassure 
investors of the solvency of the public sector. 
Important steps in the right direction have already 
been taken on all three fronts, but more could be 
done. And, more importantly, more needs to be done 
to restore confidence in the market so that Spain does 
not face the same problem as Ireland (ever-mounting 
losses in the banking system). 
iii) The EFSF should offer to exchange the 
outstanding debt of the countries under the safety 
umbrella against its own obligations at the market 
price before the countries came under the umbrella.  
iv) Once the debt exchange has been completed, the 
EFSF would negotiate with the debtor a reduction in 
the nominal value of the debt against an additional 
adjustment effort. The reduction in debt could be 
equal to the discount paid by the EFSF, thus implying 
no direct expense for euro area member countries (but 
of course they would be taking a risk). 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 
market-based debt reduction scheme proposed here. 
4.  Market-based debt reduction 
The key element of our approach is a market-based 
debt reduction without formal default. We are aware 
of the literature on this issue, which concludes that 
market-based approaches in general are beneficial for 
both creditors and debtors only when the debtor is in 
such a difficult situation that a reduction in nominal 
claims actually increases expected payments (see for 
example Krugman, 1988). It is difficult to ascertain 
that this is the case even for Greece today. However, 
we believe that a market-based debt reduction would 
still make sense in the particular situation in which the 
eurozone finds itself at present.   
The main justification of preferring a market-based 
approach is that it would avoid to a large extent the 
disruption in financial markets caused by a formal 
sovereign default. The contagion effects would be 
much more limited as market participants could 
calculate  ex ante the maximum risk they incur by 
lending to other peripheral countries.  
How should the exchange be implemented? Given the 
very low liquidity of most GIP government bond 
markets,
2 any large bond-buying programme risks 
distorting market prices. It would thus be preferable to 
avoid large-scale market interventions and rely 
instead on a public exchange offering under which the 
EFSF would offer to exchange GIP government debt 
for EFSF bonds of the same maturity valuing the GIP 
bonds at the market value before the country received 
financial assistance.
3  
For investors who have already marked their holdings 
to market, an exchange of outstanding GIP bonds 
against EFSF bonds would be attractive, as they 
would obtain a safe and liquid asset of the same 
market value. This would actually increase the access 
to the repo window of the ECB since the haircut 
applied to highly rated EFSF bonds would be much 
lower than the one applied to peripheral bonds. 
The ECB should also be encouraged to take 
advantage of this offer which would allow it to get rid 
of the portfolio of peripheral debt it had accumulated 
with its controversial ‘Securities Markets Programme’ 
under which it has so far accumulated about €77 
billion worth of GIP government bonds. At present 
market prices (and taking into account interest earned 
in the meantime), the ECB would probably not have 
incurred a loss. Once the exchange has taken place, 
the ECB would not have any reason to resume buying 
GIP (or other) government bonds.However, the real 
problems arise from the large amounts of peripheral 
debt held by other institutional investors, especially 
banks and insurance companies, which have the assets 
still at purchase or nominal value in their books. 
These institutions need to be induced by their 
supervisory authorities to write down their holdings to 
the guarantee price so that they would eventually also 
be in a position to exchange their bonds. Some banks 
might be interested anyway in getting rid of their 
holdings of peripheral debt with limited losses and 
without having to sell them on a very thin market 
because a balance sheet without any remaining 
exposure to the periphery would strengthen their own 
position in the market and lower funding costs. 
However, other banks and some insurance companies 
might not be in a position to do so because they do 
not have enough capital to bear the losses. In these 
                                                      
2 For example, the trading in Greek government bonds on 
the main Greek exchanges has collapsed to less than €10 
million daily (December 2010), compared to about half a 
billion one year earlier. See http://www.bankofgreece.gr/ 
Pages/en/Bank/News/PressReleases/DispItem.aspx?Item_I
D=3520&List_ID=1af869f3-57fb-4de6-b9ae-
bdfd83c66c95&Filter_by=DT 
3 One could argue that a further advantage of going through 
an exchange offer (instead of buying on the market) is that 
the EFSF would not have to issue additional paper on the 
primary market. We consider this a marginal aspect since 
the recipients of the EFSF paper will certainly either trade 
it on the market or use for ECB repo operations. 6 | Gros & Mayer 
cases the pressure of the supervisors needs to be 
stronger because the key point to stabilise the euro 
area’s banking system is to deal with its weaker 
elements.  
It will thus be crucial that especially the weaker banks 
are induced to write down and then exchange their 
holdings of debt of countries with an EFSF 
programme. Any capital shortfall would have to be 
made up quickly by either raising capital in the 
markets or by an infusion of public funds. This is 
exactly what was supposed to be done in the context 
of the ongoing stress tests. 
Designers of stress tests face a dilemma: they have so 
far refrained from testing the stress that markets are 
really worried about, namely a sovereign default. The 
current banking regulation is based on the assumption 
that all euro area government debt is riskless. This has 
two implications: banks do not have to hold any 
capital against their holdings of government debt and 
public debt that is held in the banking book (which 
assumes that it is held to maturity) is always valued at 
face value (whatever its market value). The first EU-
wide stress test in the summer of 2010 showed, not 
surprisingly, that close to 90% of all government debt 
held by banks is in the banking book and thus not 
subject to mark to market. Thus, the first stress test 
could not provide a clear answer to the key question: 
Which banks would not be able to survive the default 
of one or more euro area governments?  
In 2010, regulators argued that they could not 
officially test the resilience of the EU’s banking 
system to a sovereign insolvency because they would 
then have to include in their stress scenario an event 
that was officially not on the agenda. Moreover, the 
official argument was that the Greek adjustment 
programme had just started and there was no reason to 
doubt that it would succeed. It would have been 
considered illogical for governments first to put 
together a €110 billion package for Greece and then 
assume a few months later in a stress test that Greece 
goes bankrupt. 
All these arguments misunderstand the purpose of 
stress tests and the concerns in the market: namely the 
question of what would happen if the official plan 
does not work. The deeper problem of the present 
situation in which official institutions cannot even 
think about the consequences of a default is that it 
becomes impossible to develop a ‘plan B’ until ‘plan 
A’ has completely and visibly failed. But then it 
might be too late. 
5.  Numbers: Discount, exposure and 
funding requirements?  
Discount. Assuming an average maturity of bonds of 
the GIP countries of roughly five to seven years, an 
average coupon of 4.5% and a yield to maturity of 
8%, the average implied haircut priced by the market 
would seem to be between 20-25% (somewhat higher 
for Greece, but lower for Portugal). Thus, investors 
would have to write off about €130 to €160 billion of 
the aggregate debt of the GIP countries, while the 
EFSF would have to acquire an exposure of some 
€490 to €520 billion (the total public debt of the GIP 
outstanding in nominal terms amounts to about €650 
billion).  
This is a large, but not intolerable risk burden for the 
EMU countries. Assuming as a worst case that the 
fundamental value of GIP debt is only 60% of GIP 
GDP (or around €340 billion), the maximum loss 
EMU countries could suffer would be around €180 
billion. Taking this risk would undoubtedly be 
painful, but, at an exposure of little more than 1.5% of 
EMU GDP, it should be considered an acceptable 
price to pay for the stabilisation of the euro (or rather 
its financial markets).  
Bank debt. This calculation is based only on the 
presently outstanding public debt of the three GIP 
countries. Once a country enters a crisis, one has to 
add bank debt to public debt. One could thus argue 
that the cost of bank recapitalisation would have to be 
added to the sum mentioned so far. The Greek and 
Irish programmes already allow for this. However, 
when bank debt becomes public debt, the assets of the 
banks also become public assets. Whether or not bank 
rescues increase public debt is thus essentially a 
question of the quality of the assets on the books of 
the banking system. This is a key point for Spain and 
Ireland, whose experience has shown that asset 
quality can deteriorate quickly (or simply be 
misjudged at the outset). This is why we recommend 
a large programme of asset sales for Ireland and Spain 
to reassure investors on this point (discussed in more 
detailed below).
4 
External debt. In estimating the risk that euro area 
member countries take as creditors of the post-
exchange public sector liabilities of the GIP countries, 
one should not look only at the public debt of these 
countries, because the ability of these countries to 
service their obligations to other euro area countries is 
a question of their ability (and willingness) to transfer 
                                                      
4  The governments and banks in distress often retain the 
hope that the true value of their assets is much higher and 
resist asset sales with the argument that a ‘fire sale’ does 
not allow them to realise this ‘true’, long term value.  ,It 
will be very important, however, to allow as many as 
possible potential foreign investors to undertake a due 
diligence of these assets so that they can form their own 
opinion. The market will trust the results of such a process 
much more than the ever-changing numbers that regulators 
and accountants put into the balance sheets of the troubled 
banks in Ireland and Spain. Debt reduction without default? | 7 
real resources to foreign residents. Public debt that is 
owed to domestic residents can in principle always be 
served because it represents just a transfer within 
society, and could be financed for example through a 
capital levy on deposits or other tangible assets (of 
residents). In reality, as can be seen from Table 2, 
only for Greece and Portugal does our preferred 
measure of foreign debt (the cumulated current 
account) exceed 60% of GDP. 
 
Table 2. External and government debt (% of GDP) 
Panel a 
Net 
international 
investment 
position (2009)  
Net external 
debt from 
cumulated 
current 
account 
Government 
debt 2010 
Greece -88  108  141 
Ireland -102  19  97 
Portugal -113  105  83 
Spain -96  59  64 
Italy -20  9 119 
 Panel b 
Ratio of (net) external debt to 
government debt 
Greece 0.8 
Ireland 0.2 
Portugal 1.3 
Spain 0.9 
Italy 0.1 
Note: Net external debt is computed as the sum of current account 
balances over the period 1990-2010. 
Sources: Commission Services (Ameco database) and IMF 
International Financial Statistics.  
 
The key point is thus that for some countries external 
sustainability should not be a problem, even if their 
public debt is very large. For Greece net foreign debt 
is approximately equal to four-fifths of the net public 
debt of the country (see Panel b of Table 2).
5 For 
Portugal foreign debt is about 30% higher than public 
debt. But for Ireland most of the debt is domestic 
since the foreign debt of the country is only one-fifth 
of the public debt. This implies that the rough 
calculation made above of the risk taken by euro area 
countries as creditors of the post-exchange public debt 
of the three GIP countries represents, if anything, an 
upper bound of the risk taken by the EFSF. 
Funding requirements. Financing this debt exchange 
would require an increase in the size of the EFSF, 
although in principle the headline funding of the €440 
                                                      
5 There are many ways to measure net foreign debt. We 
prefer to look at the cumulated current account position and 
the international investment position of the country. 
billion EFSF, plus the EFSM of €60 billion plus the 
€60 billion already earmarked for bilateral credits to 
Greece would be sufficient to cover all three GIP 
countries (i.e. sufficient to acquire 100% of the 
outstanding public debt at the average discount 
mentioned above). In reality somewhat less might be 
needed as some investors will not want to sell their 
holdings of GIP debt because their own evaluation of 
the repayment probabilities is different from that of 
the market average today. In the banking sector only 
the most strongly capitalised institutions would be 
allowed to pursue this gamble.
6 
Another avenue to ensure that banks do participate in 
the exchange offer is for the ECB to return to its pre- 
crisis rules on collateral and stop accepting lowly 
rated bonds as collateral. If the old bonds can no 
longer be used for repo operations at the ECB, most 
banks would have a strong incentive to tender their 
holdings for the exchange. It is possible, but not 
certain that ratings agencies would classify the debt of 
the countries in question as ‘selective default’. Under 
current rules, this would oblige the ECBto decline to 
accept this debt henceforth for its monetary policy 
operations. 
Once the EFSF has acquired most of the outstanding 
GIP debt, it would start negotiations on debt relief 
with these countries. The EFSF would offer to write 
down the nominal value of its claims to a level 
consistent with the price it had paid for the bonds. As 
a counterpart for this debt relief, the countries 
concerned would have to undertake an additional 
adjustment effort whose details would of course have 
to be negotiated in detail. The EFSF could thus 
deliver to the country (conditional on the 
implementation of the additional adjustment 
programme) the bonds it bought on the market against 
new bonds of the country concerned. These new 
bonds should have a long maturity, ideally at least 10 
years or more with an interest rate equal to the 
refinancing cost of the EFSF plus a moderate 
servicing charge.
7 
                                                      
6 Investors holding out will be aware that default becomes 
more likely the more systemically important investors have 
been paid out. Hence, the lower the remaining outstanding 
debt in the market, the higher is the likelihood of default on 
this residual debt. This should provide an additional 
incentive for investors to accept the exchange. 
7 It is actually not that straightforward to determine the 
refinancing cost of the EFSF. At present the EFSF has 
issued only a very limited amount of bonds, which trade 
about 50 to 60 basis points above German government 
bonds of similar maturity. But in the exchange proposed 
here, the EFSF would not need to go to the market as it just 
exchanges its bonds against the distressed debt. Arguably 
the cost of the EFS would be the interest rate it offers to 
pay on its own bonds. This interest rate might well be 
considerably lower than the market yield on the small 8 | Gros & Mayer 
It is of course possible that the market discount is not 
enough to ensure sustainability (under realistic 
assumption about growth). The EFSF might agree on 
a lower interest rate and/or even longer maturities. 
But, to offset this subsidy, the EFSF should insist on a 
call option for additional payments by the country in 
case GDP growth exceeds a certain threshold (GDP 
warrants).
8 This would make sense in a longer-term 
perspective since for over indebted countries only a 
return to growth can make the debt sustainable. The 
experience with the Irish adjustment programme has 
shown that it is politically very divisive for the EU if 
an official institution were to insist on punitive 
interest rates from a country whose economy remains 
in depression for a long time. All the official 
adjustment programmes foresee a return to healthy 
growth within a couple of years. It would thus make 
sense for an official institution like the EFSF to 
express its confidence in the very programmes it 
finances. 
A key condition for our approach to work of course is 
that the debt level after the exchange is sustainable. 
We believe that this would be the case even for 
Greece, the most heavily indebted country. Many 
observers casually assert that solvency can be re-
established in Greece only if debt is cut by at least 
half. We disagree. Experience shows that often even a 
relatively small reduction in debt can lead to a 
restoration of market access at favourable rates. For 
example in the case of Mexico, in the 1980s, a ‘hair 
cut’ of 35% turned the situation around. Technically 
speaking, the relationship between the risk premium 
and debt levels is highly non-linear. Beyond a certain 
threshold, higher debt leads quickly to higher risk 
premia. It is the combination of the two that can 
render the debt service unbearable. The Annex 
provides some illustrative calculations, which show 
that sustainability could be restored even for Greece 
                                                                                        
outstanding amount of EFSF bonds since one could argue 
that the current yield on EFSF bonds is not the best 
benchmark given their limited liquidity and given that the 
EFSF is still a new issuer.  
8 Gros (2010a) provides some illustrative calculations for 
the value of GDP warrants under which (for example) the 
government of Greece would offer to allocate a certain 
percentage of any increment in nominal GDP (after the 
trough expected for 2010-11) to additional payments to 
foreign creditors, pro rata their present holdings. If Greece 
were to pay to foreign creditors about 4-5% of any 
increment in nominal GDP substantial payments could built 
up over time, with full (even if late) payment likely of the 
post-exchange debt, if Greece returns to a decent growth 
path. See also Borenzstein & Mauro (2002). 
through a combination of debt relief of the proportion 
calculated above with a stable low interest rate.
9 
One cannot expect that the (conditional) debt relief 
offered by the EFSF will re-establish immediately full 
market access. But the funding requirements of the 
GIP countries would be much reduced because their 
deficits would be even lower than the baseline 
assumed in the existing programmes and the 
refinancing needs of debt coming due much reduced. 
These limited and hopefully temporary financing 
needs could be borne by the IMF programmes which 
already today form part of the financing packages for 
Greece and Ireland (most of which remains unspent 
so far). The IMF could thus continue to fulfil its 
normal role, and its non-European members would be 
more likely to support the relatively large 
programmes for the GIP countries given that the debt 
exchange will have improved the sustainability of 
their finances. The combination of debt exchange, 
reduced deficits and available IMF funding would 
effectively mean that the GIP countries would not 
need to go to the markets for the next few years. 
6.  Seniority: The public sector must be 
consistent 
The ultimate aim of any debt reduction scheme is to 
allow the debtor to regain access to capital markets. 
Given that the GIP countries will still have a high 
public debt after any market-based reduction, this will 
be possible only if the euro-area partner countries are 
willing to take on some risk. 
Immediately after the debt exchange, the EFSF would 
hold most of the GIP public bonds.  Since it acquired 
these bonds at market prices it would not constitute a 
senior creditor, nor should it pretend to be one. This 
implies that at this point the debt exchange should not 
have negative impact on remaining private creditors. 
However, once the EFSF has negotiated (and 
implemented) a debt reduction, it would become a 
direct creditor of the GIP countries and could pretend 
seniority status given the nature of its lending and 
maybe given its supranational status (de facto, of 
course but so far not de jure).
10 But this should not be 
done because it would make it very difficult for the 
GIP countries to return to capital markets. 
                                                      
9 For an indication of what might be realistic, see Alcidi & 
Gros (2010), which provides an account of the European 
experience with large fiscal adjustments. 
10 The senior status of supranational lending (especially for 
the IMF) is more a widely accepted practice than a legal 
principle. In reality member countries can exert much more 
pressure on a defaulting country than private creditors can. 
What is thus needed is more a political signal that the 
creditor countries are willing to take a risk, rather than a 
legal text. Debt reduction without default? | 9 
At an earlier stage of the crisis – in April/May of 2010 
– member states explicitly made an important choice, 
but one not widely noted at the time, by requiring 
neither their bilateral loans to Greece, nor the EFSF 
credits, to be senior to other, private-sector claims. 
Germany thus had explicitly accepted at that time that 
it might make losses in the event that Greece, or any 
recipient of EFSF support, could not service its debt. 
This changed with the statement of the Euro group of 
29 November 2010, which stated explicitly that loans 
from the future crisis resolution mechanism (ESM) 
would have a standing senior to private creditors (and 
only subordinate to the IMF). Moreover, the Euro 
group also announced at that time that the Greek 
package and the existing EFSF package(s) would be 
rolled into the new permanent mechanism. In practice 
this means that if Greece were to have to restructure 
its debt once the new mechanism comes into force 
(presumably by 2013), the official creditors would be 
repaid first and the losses would mainly have to be 
borne by the private creditors.  
Finance ministers are the ultimate insiders. If they 
decide that they need to protect their own lending via 
a seniority clause, they are sending a clear signal to 
financial markets: buyers (without seniority) beware; 
we have doubts the country can fully service its debt! 
It should thus be no surprise that risk premier shot up 
in response. 
As long as official creditors insist on making their 
‘liquidity’ assistance safe by making it senior to 
private claims, they are making private claims junior. 
This implies that more official financing can only 
make private claims more junior (and thus private 
financing more costly). After all a country has on the 
asset side of its balance sheet a (limited) capacity to 
service debt. Changing the composition of the liability 
side by making some claims senior to others will not 
change the market value of their total. The conclusion 
is clear: If official credits are made senior, the average 
cost of debt for the debtor country concerned does not 
fall when it receives official financing (assuming 
official financing has a lower cost) since there will be 
a corresponding increase in the cost of private 
funding.
11 
These considerations apply especially in the case of 
Greece where one would expect that even after the 
debt exchange the debt ratio would remain 120% of 
GDP. For example if bonds with a nominal value of 
around €240 billion were exchanged at an average 
discount of 25% the reduction in the nominal value of 
the debt the scheme could achieve would be €60 
billion, or a little less than 30% of the Greek GDP 
(now around €220 billion, but shrinking). With a 
debt/GDP ratio around 150% today, this would imply 
                                                      
11 See also Gros (2010b). 
that this ratio would fall after the debt exchange to 
around 120% of GDP. This is still a value that might 
leave some room for doubts about the solvency of the 
Greek government given its poor track record in 
raising revenues. 
As argued above, the official stance needs to be 
consistent. An adjustment programme that is 
supposed to re-establish debt sustainability cannot be 
credible if its main promoters (in reality, the creditor 
member states) express their own scepticism about the 
success of the programme by requiring punitive 
interest rates and making their claims senior. 
If the EFSF (or its successor institution) does not 
pretend to have more rights than a normal private 
investor, it will also become easier for the countries to 
raise funds on the capital market to pre-pay the EFSF 
should their economic conditions improve more than 
expected.  
7.  Asset sales to deleverage the 
sovereign 
We have assumed throughout that the case of Spain is 
different in the sense that public debt is still relatively 
low (around 60% of GDP, albeit rising quickly) and 
that the losses in its banking sector should be 
manageable. However, this view is clearly not shared 
by enough market participants, as evidenced by the 
risk premia the Spanish government has to pay, and 
the difficulties many Spanish banks are facing in 
refinancing themselves on the market.  
In Spain the weakest part of the banking system are 
the local savings and loans (called cajas), which have 
financed mostly residential mortgages and local 
property developers. Most of the cajas are thus in 
trouble. Simply aggregating the weaker institutions 
into a small number of bigger ones does not really 
address the underlying problem. On the contrary it 
might make it even more difficult to deal with. The 
savings that could be achieved by consolidation are 
minor: the total personnel cost of all the cajas 
together amounts to around €9 billion per annum. 
Even assuming that 20% of this could be saved by 
consolidation would imply savings of less than €2 
billion per annum, which is a magnitude smaller than 
even the margin of uncertainty concerning the value 
of the over €900 billion in assets on the books of these 
institutions. Moreover, firing costs are known to be 
rather high in Spain. Any reduction in personnel 
would thus in the short run require additional funding 
of severance pay. 
Aggregating a number of weak smaller institutions 
into bigger ones makes it ever more difficult to have 
any private sector contribution to the losses because 
the larger institutions, created essentially under 
government orders, become automatically ‘too big’ 10 | Gros & Mayer 
and ‘too politically sensitive’ to fail. By not letting 
any of the smaller and weaker of the cajas fail, the 
Spanish government is increasing the risk for itself.  
This gamble might pay off if the value of the loans on 
the books of the cajas is really as high as assumed by 
the accountants of the cajas and the regulators. 
However, the still rather comforting valuations of the 
loan book of the cajas (and the other Spanish banks) 
are underpinned mainly by the still relatively low 
losses rates in Spain so far and the tendency by 
accountants and regulators to look only at the losses 
for this year and at most those expected one year 
ahead. But this is misleading since the Spanish 
property bust will likely last the better part of this 
decade. The experience of Ireland has shown that 
losses can escalate rapidly as the property bust 
deepens. In this respect it seems that the worst is still 
to come in Spain where house prices have fallen 
relatively little (less than 15%) from their peak which 
according to many estimates was perhaps 100% above 
the longer-run equilibrium. Moreover, the experience 
of the US has shown that during a property bust house 
prices might actually undershoot the long-run 
equilibrium, especially when there has been 
overbuilding on such a vast scale as in Ireland and 
Spain. 
The only way to eliminate this uncertainty about the 
size of the eventual losses would be a disposal of the 
doubtful (perhaps the qualification ‘toxic’ would be 
appropriate under current circumstances) assets. In 
Spain this could take several forms. For example, a 
sale of the cajas to foreign institutions (either 
investors with deep pockets or very well capitalised 
foreign banks) would give the market a guarantee that 
Spain will not become a second Ireland, i.e. that the 
liabilities of the Spanish sovereign are limited. A 
further consolidation of the Spanish banking sector by 
a takeover of the cajas by some of the large Spanish 
banks would not solve the problem of the potential for 
large implicit liabilities for the Spanish government.  
Another way to limit the potential for losses for the 
Spanish government would be asset sales in the 
narrow sense: the regulators could force the cajas that 
have already been taken over to sell part of their loan 
book, again preferably to foreign investors. This 
might be politically easier and quicker given that even 
the transformation of the legal structure of the cajas 
into limited liability companies might take some time.  
In either case the prices at which loan books can be 
sold will give a clear and market-based signal of the 
losses that investors expect still to come. This applies 
a forteriori also to the case of Ireland. It is no longer 
possible to sell any of the Irish banks. But their loan 
book is still on their books at the equivalent of over 
two times national income. If this is their true value, 
the Irish government would not have any further 
losses to bear and should be able to service the debt it 
has incurred so far. However, as long as doubts persist 
that the value of these loans is in reality much lower, 
the Irish government will not be able to access capital 
markets.  
The Irish and Spanish governments have de facto 
leveraged themselves very highly due to the explicit 
(Ireland) and implicit (so far Spain) guarantees they 
have given to their banks. These guarantees are off 
balance sheet and thus do not appear explicitly as 
public debt, but the bond markets see through this 
fiction and aggregate public and bank debt and 
require a hefty risk premium. The best way to reduce 
this risk premium would be large-scale asset sales. 
Here again the authorities should be consistent and 
should be confident that the market will validate their 
point of view once given a chance to look at all the 
details that an investor will undoubtedly require in a 
due diligence process.
12 
8. Concluding  remarks 
The piecemeal approach to dealing with the euro 
area’s sovereign debt crisis (instead of a 
comprehensive solution along the lines sketched 
above) runs the risk of cutting off one country after 
another from market funding. It has been suggested 
that the EFSF be increased to cover all potential 
problem countries. But simply increasing the size of 
the EFSF may raise market fears of a financial over-
burdening of the core countries and hence extend the 
crisis of trust eventually to all EMU member 
countries. It has also been suggested that the ECB 
step up its bond purchase programme and acquire 
EUR1-2trn of bonds of troubled EMU countries. In 
our view, however, this, as well as the suggestion to 
assume joint liability for EMU countries’ entire debt, 
would undermine the contractual basis of EMU and 
seriously weaken acceptance of EMU in the core 
countries. 
We have outlined a market-based scheme to achieve a 
substantial reduction in debt for the most distressed 
sovereign borrowers. This scheme could serve as a 
bridge from the present situation under which a 
combination of a weak banking system and acute 
insolvency problems creates tensions that require ever 
more public funds.   
The debt exchange offer we recommend does not 
constitute a silver bullet that will solve all issues. To 
work it will require an intensification of the 
adjustment efforts in all countries and an aggressive 
programme of asset disposal in Ireland and Spain to 
ensure the solvency of the sovereign in both countries. 
                                                      
12 The same course of action might be useful for Portuguese 
banks, which are becoming the Achilles heel for the 
country. Debt reduction without default? | 11 
Moreover, the EU (or rather the EFSF) must be 
consistent in its actions and express its confidence in 
the solvency of the peripheral countries (after the debt 
reduction) by providing them with the equivalent of 
equity, rather than senior debt. As long as official 
creditors pretend to be senior to private ones, these 
countries will not be able to return to the market. 
Having dealt with the emergency, a new EMU 
architecture can then be constructed that enshrines the 
lessons learnt from the current crisis. What is needed 
in our view is a further step towards economic 
integration combined with some risk-sharing of EMU 
countries while still preserving the character of EMU 
as a ‘limited liability company’. 
In this longer-term perspective, we regard our 
proposal as a key step to establishing the principle 
that losses on sovereign lending are possible. It is 
extremely important that markets and regulators 
actually have the experience of suffering some loss as 
this is the only way to ensure more market discipline 
(however imperfect it may be) in the future and a 
regulatory framework that abandons the concept that 
sovereign lending is riskless. The present situation is 
untenable as it contains an inherent contradiction 
between the insistence on the legal fiction that there 
will never be a bail-out and the repeated cave-ins by 
the authorities at the first sign of serious market 
pressure. 
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Annex 
With the use of a numerical example calibrated to the 
case of Greece, this annex is intended to illustrate the 
impact a combination of moderate debt relief and 
lower interest rates can have on sustainability. To set 
a very undemanding benchmark, we assume that 
Greece will be able to maintain a primary surplus of 
only 4% of GDP. This is much lower than what other 
EU countries achieved during other periods of 
budgetary consolidation (often in the vicinity of 5-6% 
of GDP). We also assume that the trend growth rate of 
nominal GDP will be only 3%. This is clearly an 
extremely conservative assumption. Over the next few 
years, the Greek economy is indeed likely to stagnate 
and for some time wages and prices will have to 
increase less than elsewhere in order to re-establish 
competitiveness. But this should not last forever, as 
implicitly assumed in our calculations. As to the 
interest rate, we assume that without the debt 
exchange, the Greek government would be lucky if it 
could refinance itself at 7%, whereas the EFSF could 
offer around 4% as argued above. We then calculated 
the path for the debt-to-GDP ratio with and without 
the debt exchange as proposed by us assuming that 
the debt exchange yields a reduction in debt of only 
around 22%, reducing public debt from the 155% of 
GDP to be expected in 2012 to about 120%. The chart 
below shows clearly that the debt exchange 
(combined with EFSF financing) would put the 
country on a stable path, whereas that would not be 
the case if there were no cut in debt. 
 
  
 
Sustainable and unsustainable paths of Greek public debt
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
D
e
b
t
/
G
D
P
Debt/GDP no change Debt/GDP after exchangeAbout CEPS
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels
Tel : 32(0)2.229.39.11 • Fax : 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail:  info@ceps.eu
Website : www.ceps.eu
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as an leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	act	as	a	forum	for	discussion	among	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process
•	 To	provide	a	regular	flow	of	authoritative	
publications	offering	policy	analysis	and	
recommendations.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	our	
publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Multidisciplinary,	multinational	&	multicultural	
research	team.	
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Seven	research	networks,	comprising	numerous	
other	highly	reputable	institutes,	to	complement	
and	consolidate	CEPS’	research	expertise	and	to	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	Corporate	and	
Institutional	Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	
practical	experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	
for	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies •	
Financial	Markets	&	Institutions •	
Energy	&	Climate	Change	 •	
Regulatory	Policy •	
EU	Foreign,	Security	&	Neighbourhood	Policy •	
Justice	&	Home	Affairs •	
Politics	&	Institutions •	
Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy •	
Research	Networks
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI) •	
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP) •	
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI) •	
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation		 	 •	
	 (ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy		 	 •	
	 Research	Institutes	(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN) •	
European	Security	Forum	(ESF) •	
CEPS	organises	a	variety	of	activities,	involving	its	
members	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	European	
policy	debate,	including	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	
NGOs	and	the	media.	Its	funding	is	obtained	
from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	membership	
fees,	project	research,	foundation	grants,	
conferences	fees,	publication	sales	and	an	annual	
grant	from	the	European	Commission.